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CHAPTER NINE
Spectatorship and Subjectivity
" E. Deidre Pribram
The study of spectatorship is an attempt to understand why we choose to sit in 
the movie theater seat or on the living-room sofa captivated by a screen. What is 
it that makes the experience so pleasurable, desirable, meaningful - given that 
viewing subjects position themselves as filmic or televisual spectators voluntarily, 
in very large numbers, and with frequent repetition.? What are the relationships 
between individual and filmic process: how are we linked to screen, narrative, 
character? Whq exactly is the subject seated before the screen, involved in an 
activity which has been described as everything from passive absorption to active 
production of the text?
Concepts of the spectator are inseparable from theories of the human subject. 
That is, notions of spectatorship, while not identical to, change in conjunction 
with, evolving or altering conceptualizations of subjectivity. The three “sub­
jects” discussed here - psychoanalytic, discursive, and social - are all post­
structuralist in that they are constructed through socio-cultural and ideological 
forces. This is in contrast to the humanist subject of the age of Enlightenment 
through modernism, a unified, coherent being who is able to know “truth.” In 
the latter schema, the universe operates according to rules of logic and reason 
which “man” can ascertain. Rationahty and science, emanating from the huma­
nist subject, replace the earlier ordering of divine providence.
Post-structuralism, in contrast, posits a decentered, noncoherent, externally 
constructed rather than internally originating subject. The study of (post-struc­
turalist) spectatorship is the search for what constitutes the person seated in front 
of the movie or television screen, and an exploration of which configurations, out 
of limitless possibilities, constitute viewing subjects so that they see themselves, 
the text, and the world(s) it represents within specific systems of meaning.
1 The Psychoanalytic Subject
The psychoanalytic concepts used in film studies are based on the work of 
French theorist Jacques Lacan, who, in turn, built upon Sigmund Freud’s
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pioneering work on the unconscious, sexuality, and subject formation. Freud 
hypothesized that children are introduced into sexuality in the first few, for­
mative years of life. Believing that the myth of Oedipus Rex mirrors the 
desires and events of infant sexuality, Freud based his description on the 
Greek myth in which Oedipus, unwittingly, kills his father and marries his 
mother. In the Oedipus complex, the male infant develops a desire for his 
mother and comes to perceive his father, who is the rival for his mother’s 
affection, ^s the obstacle to the fulfillment of his desire. The outcome is that 
the boy identifies strongly with the father in order that he can take the father’s 
place vis-à-vis the mother. In other words, he becomes the father so that he can 
desire the mother, and so, “woman.” For female infants, the process is similar 
but the inverse: the object of desire is the father and identification occurs in 
relation to the mother.
But in either case, the oedipal stage and its resolution enable the child to take 
up its assigned place in terms of gender identification, or “sexual difference.” It 
is at this-moment that the infant emerges into a world ordered by sexed selfhood, 
that is masculinity and femininity.
Indebted to Freud, Lacan was also extremely influenced by linguistics and 
structuralism, which attributed culture and consciousness to the acquisition of 
language. Without language, we cannot develop a sense of ourselves as individu­
ated, cognitive beings. Integrating Freudian analysis with contemporary work on 
structural linguistics, Lacan’s description of human formative development 
tracks how the infant becomes acculturated, how he or she is brought into 
being as a member of society. The penis of Freudian sexuality (which the girl 
infant is aware she lacks, the boy infant fearing a similar “castration”) becomes 
the phallus - the bearer of male identity, that is, of patriarchal power. In this 
scenario the child emerges not only into sexual difference but into a larger 
patriarchal order. To resolve the Oedipus complex in language is to take one’s 
place as a member within phallocentric culture.
In Lacan’s analysis, the first stage of this process for the infant is the Imaginary 
- “Imaginary” not only in the sense of illusory, but as a pre-linguistic order 
dominated by images. This is the world of the mother, a world of unity, 
connectedness, fullness, and satisfaction, in which the infant and mother are 
one. The infant has no sense of itself as a separate being but only as part of the 
mother. The second stage is the Mirror Phase, in which the infant recognizes its 
own reflected image, suggesting that it is a separate being. Finally, there is the 
Symbolic. This is the world of the father, the world of language, of meaning 
production, of law in the sense of cultural order, concepts of justice and 
morality, and so on. It is into the Symbolic that the infant steps at the end of 
its early, formative years, at the resolution of the Oedipus complex and at the 
moment of language acquisition. These three stages - the Imaginary, the 
Mirror Phase, anà the Symbolic - together constitute the subject; in Lacan’s 
system, the process of moving through these phases establishes the infant as 
subjective being.
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As the stage of oneness with the mother, the Imaginary is considered illusory 
because such unity does not materially exist and because the phase, of necessity, 
must pass. However, the infant, as she or he grows, is “haunted by the memory of 
this original illusory experience of plenitude when baby and world were one” 
(Gledhill 1984: 30). This is the desire for the mother outlined in the Oedipus 
complex; it is a desire for connectedness and the longing to return to a state of 
fullness which stays with the child as he or she grows up and long after having 
entered the Symbolic.
The entry into the world of language occurs when the child realizes the 
concept of difference. The illusion of unity with the mother, and therefore 
with the world, is broken, and the infant becomes aware of itself as a separate 
being. The world hedomes differentiated into the self or subject versus objects 
and oAers. The moment of entry into the Symbolic, into culture, is a function of 
realizing the difference between self and Other. The establishment of one’s 
subjectivity cannot occur without comparison to an objectified Other.
While the Imaginary is a world of unity, the Symbolic is a world of separation 
and loss. But the child must accept entry into the Symbolic as the process of 
becoming an adult and taking up one’s position as a social being. Simultaneously, 
however, the longing for the Imaginary is never lost, establishing the unconscious 
as the location for these unfulfilled desires. Further, the unity of the Imaginary 
can never be retrieved in its original state of wholeness or plenitude, but only as 
phantasy, in which other objects or representations act as temporary replace­
ments or equivalences. This produces a never-ceasing sense of lack, provoking 
the subject into a constant search for the replenishment of unity and fullness, the 
achievement of which must always be deferred.
Film scholars such as Christian Metz have taken Lacan’s work and theorized 
that the cinematic experience is one of the locations in which the drives and 
desires of the Imaginary surface and are played out. In The Imaginary Signifier, 
Metz examines cinema’s role as “a technique of the imaginary”:
[T]he subterranean persistence of the exclusive relation to the mother, desire as a
pure effect of lack and endless pursuit, the initial core of the unconscious___All
this is undoubtedly reactivated by the play of that other mirror, the cinema screen, 
in this respect a veritable psychical substitute. (1982: 3^)
In this analysis, the viewing experience triggers unconscious desires and phan­
tasies in such a way that the screen-spectator relationship replicates - or sub­
stitutes for - the very operations of the unconscious. Moreover, it is film’s 
activation of desires associated with the Imaginary which explains cinematic 
pleasure, the gratifying sensation of which prompts spectators to return to the 
film-viewing experience repeatedly.
Metz then attempts to account for the mechanisms by which the material base 
of the medium, the images and sounds of the text, reenact or retrieve the 
unconscious. From “The Fiction Film and its Spectator” in The Imaginary 
Signifier:
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[H]ow does the spectator effect the mental leap which alone can lead him [itr] from 
the perceptual donnée, consisting of moving visual and auditory impressions, to the 
constitution of a fictional universe, from an objectively real but denied signifier to 
an imaginary but psychologically real signified? (116)
Incorporating suçh work as Jean-Louis Baudry’s “Ideological Effects of the Basic 
Cinematographic Apparatus,” Metz describes the “filmic state,” the institu­
tional, technological, and psychological conditions in which, or from which, the 
spectator views the film. It is this filmic state which causes the viewer to be lulled
into a “waking sleep,” a semi-regressive or phantasy state which accesses the 
unconscious.
However, the interaction of spectator and screen/fihn text doesn’t simply 
pleasure a fixed, pre-existing subject, but actually produces or constitutes the 
viewer as subject in the process. “[F]ilm-viewing and subject-formation [are] 
reciprocal processes: something about our unconscious identity as subjects is 
reinforced in film viewing, and film viewing is effective because of our uncon­
scious participation---- [T]he cinema ‘reinscribes’ those very deep and globally
structuring processes which form the human psyche” (Flitterman-Lewis 1992; 
124). In semiotic and post-structuralist conceptions of subjectivity, the subject is 
continually constructed through signifying or meaning-producing practices such 
as cinema.
In other words, psychoanalytic film theory is concerned with establishing the 
complex, myriad mechanisms by which the relationship of spectator to screen 
links the human psyche, particularly the unconscious, to the film text. Through 
the circulation of psychoanalytic attributes such as desire, phantasy, and identi­
fication, the spectetor-screen process, among other cultural processes, constructs 
the psychoanalytic subject, also variously referred to as the desiring subject, the 
sexual subject, and the screen subject.
Another important cinematic arena that utilized Lacanian concepts of psycho­
analysis was feminist film theory, investigating and adapting those concepts to fit, 
more appropriately, a political agenda. Combining Freudian/Lacanian psycho­
analysis with studies in ideology, in the work of Louis Althusser and others, 
feminist film theory managed to invert psychoanalytic theories so that the 
theories fundamentally critiqued the phallogocentric structures they previously 
seemed to be simply describing or otherwise naturalizing.
The appeal of psychoanalytic theories for feminist film studies could be found 
in their description of gender as a culturally acquired series of attributes, rather 
than the effect of biological determinism (anatomy as destiny, women’s “natural” 
place, etc.). The concept of cultural acquisition implies the potential for change, 
crucial to a political movement, while deterministic notions foreclose the pursuit 
of altered gender relations. The idea that gender acculturation occurs in the first 
few pars of life, prior to the advent of memory, also seemed to account for the 
persistence of male domination over women across diverse cultures and historical 
eras, without proscribing the possibility of altered relations. Further, the
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contention that sexual difference is such a primary source of self-identity, of 
subjectivity, opened up many possibilities for further feminist analyses.
The initiatory work of Laura Mulvey, Pam Cook, and Claire Johnston outlined 
how, within a patriarchal order, the male is constructed as subject while women 
are relegated to object, to the Other, against which male subjectivity is produced. 
In a short article first published in 1973, “Fears, Fantasies and the Male 
Unconscious or ‘You Don’t Know What Is Happening, Do You, Mr. Jones.?’,” 
Laura Mulvey writes about sculptor Allen Jones and his “Women as Furniture” 
series, “in which life-size effigies of women, slave-like and sexually provocative, 
double as hat-st^ds, tables and chairs” (1989a: 6). Mulvey’s point is that the 
sculptures, as with dominant forms of representation in general, do not reflect 
“real” women, th^t is, social beings existing in a material world. Nor do cultu­
rally pervasive representations of women reflect the female unconscious or 
women’s phantasies. Rather, images of women mirror the male unconscious 
which produces those representations, and which does so on the basis of deep 
psychic structures of fear and desire. In “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” 
(1989b), Mulvey goes on to describe the specific, complex processes, including 
scopophilia, voyeurism, and fetishism, by which the male unconscious is enacted 
or performed upon the image/body of woman in cinema. Such “enactments” on 
women as an objectified Other, in film and other forms of representation, are 
central to the process of male subject formation, the primary controlling, organ­
izing, and signifying presence in patriarchal culture. But women are necessary in 
this process of male subject formation, if only as Other, as sexual difference. .In 
psychoanalytic terms, he is aware of his phallus because of her lack. In order to 
know who he is, he needs' to have before him who he is not. In Claire Johnston’s 
words, feminist film theory and practice “revealed how the economy of the 
classic realist text works towards the unquestioned Imaginary of the patriarchal 
order” (1992: 297).
In such feminist analyses, the look of the camera, the look of the characters 
within the text, and the position of narrative enunciation are all male. The film 
speaks from, for, and is addressed to the male unconscious, regardless of the 
gender of specific viewers. The cinematic apparatus and the film text position or 
construct an ideal male spectator as the terms in which the screen-spectator 
relationship occurs.
The contribution of feminist film theory based in psychoanalysis is its attempt 
to explaiii - with the hopes of dismantling - the exclusion of women from the 
dominant discourses and institutions of socio-cultural life as the function of male 
needs and drives for power. It was able to describe many of the mechanisms of 
phallic oppression (including psychoanalytic theory itself) and certainly opened 
up a wealth of new ways to read films.
However, psychoanalytically informed feminist film theory, and psychoanaly- 
tically based theories of cinema in general, pose significant, perhaps insurmoun­
table, limitations as well. In the first instance, the theories are universalizing or 
totalizing, and so exclusionary, that is, they ignore historical and cultural differ-
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enees. The subject, the individual psyche, appears to be the same, once gender 
differences are established, over time and social categories, despite class, race and 
ethnicity, nationality, sexual preference, and so on. The theory generalizes 
singular subject identities regardless of obvious differences between people, 
cultures, and eras.
In the second instance, it is difficult to accept the spectator as normatively 
male in the face of large numbers of social subjects - women who repeatedly 
attend the cinematic (and televisual) experience and do^o with evident pleasure. 
Rather,, one assumes that some manner of divergent signifying process(es) must 
occur for female spectators as well.
For feminist film theory, the theoretical conceptualizations, not solely the 
surrounding phallic economy, are monolithic and restrictive. Women are 
excluded from any legitimate position from which to view or to speak. As scholars 
such-as Teresa de Lauretis have argued, the theory leaves us caught in the orbit of 
the male and not-male, while what is necessary (and desirable) aren’t considera­
tions of what it means to be “not-male,” but rather what it means to be “women.” 
The theories themselves, not just patriarchal culture, limit the ability to explore 
women’s own fears and desires, and to give voice to women’s psychic lives.
Feminist scholars originally were drawn to psychoanalytic theories because of 
their capacity to explain gender identity in cultural rather, than biological terms. 
However, psychoanalytic theory led to similarly reductive or absolutist notions in 
which the problem of how to alter the psychoanalytic construction of sexual 
difference, so apparently early and fundamentally formative of identity, seemed 
nearly as insurmountable as arguments based on biological determinism.
The response of early feminist film theorists to such an apparently exclusion­
ary and detrimental positioning of female spectators by dominant cinematic 
forms was to call for a denial of films which embodied traditional visual and 
narrative pleasures, as the title of Mulvey’s article suggests (initiatory feminist 
analyses and critiques were very much aimed at classic realist film and not at the 
concept of cinema in toto). Films of traditional narrative pleasure were to be 
replaced, instead, by avant-garde work which made evident the workings of those 
traditional pleasures or created alternative modes of gratification for viewers. 
While a number of the films that resulted were striking, original, and successful, 
much of'the work was textually difficult, tending to create specialized audiences, 
and so, ignoring or excluding wider bands of spectators, including, potentially 
and contradictorily, large numbers of women.
At the' same time, the refusal to participate in forms‘of dominant culture 
seemed to position the feminist avant-garde as exacerbating or. actively particip­
ating in the exclusion of women from the centers of cinematic production and 
reception. As it was unrealistic to assume that mainstream cinema was going to 
cease to be either mainstream or dominant, it made more sense to attempt to 
appropriate such forms in ways that benefited women. This entailed exploring 
other, more productive ways in which popular narrative cinema might provide its 
audiences with pleasures. The development of less restrictive theories and
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practices was necessary in order that women could be represented in and 
addressed by cinema, as social subjects and as spectators, m alternative, m e- 
pendent, and dominant arenas - in other words, wherever and whenever film
occurs.
2 The Discursive Subject
Feminist awareness of the need for reconceptualizing psychoanalytic theories 
coincided with - and helped enable - important shifts in the concepts of cinema, 
culture, and^tíbjectivity. Evolving notions of subject formation, and therefore 
spectatorship, moved to respond to the two large problematics incurred by 
psychoanalysis. First, in post-structuralist theories beyond Lacan, the universa- 
izing “sameness” of subjectivity is superseded by the discursive subject, a much 
more complex, multi-layered understanding of how the self is constitute . 
Second, the posited absence of social beings from the mechanisms and interac­
tions of spectatorship is redressed in the audience studies and reception theories 
of cultural studies, via close examination of the viewing practices of specific social
subjects (discussed in the following section).
In discursive theory, individual identity is not a function of singular, solely 
psychic or unaltering processes, but rather, subjectivity is constructed by the 
cultural forces of multiple, overlapping, and sometimes competing discourses 
Sexual difference or gender, then, is one (or a plurality of) shaping discourse(s) 
among many others in the formation of identity. It is in Michel Foucault s work 
that notions of the discursive subject are most clearly delineated.
In Foucault’s terms, discourses are systems of thought or domains of know­
ledge which form around certain thematics or ideologies, for instance, justice.
A discursive practice, in this instance the juridical system, would involve mstitti- 
tions (courts, etc.) and technologies (laws, means of enforcing them). Together, 
the discourses, institutions, and technologies interact as the discursive formation 
of the law. The discursive formation of heterosexuality would involve institutions 
and technologies such as marriage, and discourses such as romance, love, and so
In discursive theory, the (humanistic) subject does not predate, conceive of, or 
invent the discourse; discourse is not a “phenomenon of expression by a 
“transcendental subject” (Foucault 1972: 5^5). Rather, and very importantly, 
the subject is constituted by the discourse. So, the law-abiding citizen and the 
criminal are constructs of the discursive practice of the law, husbands and wives 
are the subjective effects of heterosexuality, and so on. In this account, the 
individual is the intersection or collection of discourses which constitute or 
articulate him or her. In other words, the self is the effect of cultural processes.
Originally influenced by structural linguistics, in Foucault’s later work dis­
course came to be inseparable from power. Speaking of the “traditional theme 
in philosophy that “truth does not belong to the order of power, but shares an
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original affinity with freedom,” Foucault argues that this conceptualization needs 
to be overturned because “truth is not by nature free” but “thoroughly imbued 
with relations of power” (1978: 60). Power is dispersed everywhere throughou 
culture, which is not to say that it is dispersed evenly or equitably, but that 
instances of the exertion of and struggle for power occur continually, at every
level and in every configuration of culture.
Instead of the benevolent, forward-progressing, and freeing version of reason 
projected since the Enlightenment, Foucault argues a “reason,” that is, regimes 
of knowledge, that are coercive, controlling, and driven by the mechanisms and 
forces of power - although it should also be said that Foucault does not under­
stand power as simply oppressive, but sees it as a much more ‘ productive force,
in its capacity for producing cultural, relations. -, i.
Theorizing the discursive formation of sexuality, Foucault descnbes how 
experience - sexuality in this instance - is organized as a regime of knowledge/ 
power in a threefold process. Sexuality is treated as “the correlation of a doniain 
of knowledge, a type of normativity and a mode of relation to the self T e 
domain of knowledge is created by. the constitution of sexuality as a field ot 
study (with its own concepts, theories, diverse disciplines). Normativity is 
imposed by “a collection of rules (which differentiate the permissible from the 
forbidden, natural from monstrous, normal from pathological, what is decent 
from what is not, etc.).” And a mode of relation to the self occurs between the 
individual and himself [sic] (which enables him to recognize himself as a sexual
subject amid others)” (1984b; 333—4). , • «
While the thematic of a discourse may remain constant, the meaninp pr - 
duced over historical eras change. To continue with the instance of sexuality, its 
occurrences in the seventeenth century marked a departure from previous 
experiences of it. “[T]hings were said in a different way; it was different people 
who said them, from different points of view, and in order to obtain different
results” (Foucault 1978:27). . .
The function of systems of discourse and relations of power is precisely to
constitute subjectivity, to organize “techniques for ‘governing individuals - that 
is for ‘guiding their conduct’ - in domains as different as the school, the army, 
and the workshop” (1984b: 337-8). In the modern era, regimes of knowledge/ 
power are less physically or externally coercive (punishment) than they are 
internalized or self-regulated (control), through the process of normaüzation.
The process of normatizing entails a discipline describing its own field ot 
operation and creating its own object of study. So, for instance psycl^atty ^ a 
domain of knowledge was created by emerging discourses on madness. [M]ental 
illness was constituted by all that was said in all the statements that named it, 
divided it up, described it, explained it, traced its developments, indicated its 
various correlations, judged it, and possibly gave it speech by aruculatmg, in i s 
name, discourses that were to be taken as its own” (Foucault 1972: 32). However, 
in the process of constituting the object of study, the object in the sense 
of subject/object is also formulated. The conceptualization of the insane is
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necessary to the process of normatizing acceptable behavior, the criminal 
is necessary to the description of the boundaries and parameters of law and 
order, and so on. By deploying the concept of ‘insane,’ the identity of the sane 
subject is described, or proscribed. Thus, discourses of what constitutes healthi­
ness must always incorporate the ill, sanity include the mad, law-abiding the 
criminal, ‘normal’ sexuality the deviant, and so forth.
In a hypothesis structurally similar to the function of sexual difference in 
psychoanalytic theory, social relations are constructed upon conceptions of 
otherness or alterity. “The history of madness would be the history of the 
Other - of that which, for a given culture, is at once inferior and foreign, 
therefore to be^excluded (so as to exorcise the interior danger)” (Foucault 
1973: xxiv). By attempting to make the dànger of madness entirely “foreign” 
or exterior to the subject and instead locate it as embedded in the object or other - 
of the insane in this instance - the potential for its interiority or effect on the self 
is denied, and thereby its threat of the anxiety of its threat diminished.
It is critical in post-structuralist discursive theory to understand subjectivity as 
the invention or articulation of discourse. In the process of naming someone as 
mad, as object of study, or as Other, what is assembled are interpretations or 
judgments, not facts; what is constructed are meanings, not “truths.”
Although extremely influential, Foucaultian discursive theory has not been 
applied to cinema studies in any kind of systematic manner, as was attempted by 
Metz and Mulvey with Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. To date, most efforts 
have been deployed in the study of cultural discourses invoked by a particular 
text or set of texts which cite, group, or contest varying notions of the law, say, or 
sexuality. Those discursive practices specifically considered by Foucault have 
proven most accessible to film and television scholars — in the instance of 
sexuality, in gay and lesbian studies, in studies of the uses of the body, and so on.
While there are reasons that make it particularly difficult to systematically 
apply post-structuralist discursive theory to cinema studies (the polymorphous 
origins of discourse, its multiply produced effects, and the delineation of a fluid 
rather than a fixed subject), the theory’s potential productivity for representa­
tional studies is enormous. Foucault’s own preoccupation with the human or 
social sciences precluded specific analyses of forms of representation, but his 
work has certainly contributed to and enriched the way film and television 
studies are pursued, including, pivotally, their conceptions of the subject and 
spectator ship.
The result has been a broader, more complex notion of representation as a 
reflection of and a site for cultural struggles over meaning formation, that is, as a 
place where meaning production occurs and also where its structures of operation 
can be viewed. This is so because of the ability of representational forms to “stand 
in for” social processes via aesthetic and narrative codes (e.g. characters for social 
subjects), as well as their capacity to invoke or put into circulation wide-ranging 
occurrences of discursive formations or domains of knowledge (what films are 
“about”). At the core of these operations of meaning formation is the notion of the
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subject, and its cinematic version, the spectator, as the convergence, accumula­
tion, and reconfiguration of complementary/competing discourses. It is this 
spectator who has displaced the fixed, meaning-producing spectator of human­
ism/ modernism, and the fixed, meaning-effect spectator of psychoanalysis.
Two examples of studies of representational forms consonant with discursive 
understandings„of subjectivity, and so taken up and utilized by film theorists, are 
Stuart Hall’s notions of encoding/decoding and Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of 
heteroglossia. Both theories focus on a diversity of subject positions and a 
multiplicity of textual meanings.
Stuart Hall understands encoding - the production of media texts - and 
decoding - the reception of media texts - as discursive practices. “Before this 
message can have an ‘effect’ (however defined), satisfy a ‘need’ or be put to a 
‘use,’ it must first be appropriated as a meaningful discourse and be meaningfully 
decoded” (1993; 93). The spectator has the potential to interpret, construct, or 
meaningfully produce the text from one of several positions in relation to it. First, 
he or she can make a dominant or preferred reading. Hall calls such readings 
“preferred” because while they are dominant in having “the institutional/polit­
ical/ideological order imprinted in them and have themselves become institu­
tionalized,” they are not singular, fixed, or closed, “not univocal or uncontestèd”
(98).
The viewer can also forge a negotiated reading which is “a mixture of adaptive 
and oppositional elements: it acknowledges the legitimacy of the hegemonic 
definitions to make the grand significations (abstract), while, at a more restricted, 
situational (situated) level, it makes its own ground rules - it operates with 
exceptions to the rules” (102). Third, the spectator can secure an oppositional 
reading in which the message is decoded in a “globally contrary way. He/she 
detotalizes the message in the preferred code in order to retotalize the message 
with some alternative framework of reference” (103).
In this formulation, the spectator’s own varying relationship to the discourses 
invoked by the text, and the ways they are invoked, allow for a slippage between 
potential readings or viewing positions in relation to the material of the text. 
However, while the spectator is no longer “sutured” to the text in a particular 
way, preferred, negotiated, and oppositional readings continue to imply judg­
ments of “better or worse” interpretations of the text for that particular viewer 
(depending on the viewer’s or the interpreting critic’s politics). A hierarchy is 
structured in which one kind of reading is chosen or prioritized over another - 
preferred, negotiated, oppositional - displacing or occurring in place of the 
others. This problematizes a more complex Foucaultian notion of multiple, 
varied, and simultaneous discourses operating on the subject, some of which 
may be complementary to each other, while others are competing.
Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of heteroglossia, as outlined in The Dialogic 
Imagination, helps redress the limitations of a “pick or choose” or hierarchizing 
concept of readership, while retaining the complexity of Foucault’s perspectives 
on discourse and subjectivity. Heteroglossia ia “a notion of competing languages
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and discourses applying equally to ‘text’ and ‘context.’ The role of the 
artistic text, within a Bakhtinian perspective, is not to represent real life ‘exist- 
ents’ but to stage the conflicts, the coincidences and competitions of languages 
and discourses, inherent in heteroglossia” (Stam 1992: 197). As well as thé 
simultaneity of complementary/competing discourses, Bakhtin’s heteroglossia 
accounts for the simultaneous circulation and interaction of representational 
discourses (the text) and other socio-cultural discourses beyond representation 
(the context).
The most persistent criticism of Foucault’s concept of discursive subjectivity 
is that it diminates the possibility of “agency,” that is, motivated, intentional 
action and reaction on the part of the subject. If the discursive subject is entirely 
the construct of culturally determining forces via. discursive institutions and 
systems of knowledge, then the potential for internally driven response is pre­
empted. How are individual or self-willed thoughts and actions possible.? How 
can spectators actively select or reject readings if they, themselves, are the 
product or effect of cultural and textual processes? Much post-structuralist 
theory, certainly Foucault’s, has been accused of negating the agency of the 
subject and therefore eliininating necessary conditions for the possibility of 
political activity and social change.
Such accusations have been countered by theorists such as Chantal Mouffe 
and Judith Butler. Mouffe finds that a frequent misunderstanding of the anti- 
essentialist position “consists in believing that the critique of an essential identity 
must necessarily lead -to the rejection of any concept of identity whatsoever” 
(1992: 381). Mouffe contends:
It is only when .we discard the view of the subject as an agent both rational and 
transparent to itself, and discard as well the supposed unity and homogeneity of 
the ensemble of its positions, that we are in the position to theorize the multiplicity
of relations of subordination___We have rather to approach it [the social agent]
as a plurality, dependent on the various subject positions through which it is 
constituted within various discursive formations— To deny the existence of an 
a priori, necessary link between subject positions does not. mean that there are 
not constant efforts to establish between them historical, contingent, and variable 
links. (371-2)
She calls for the identification and investigation, of the multiple and changing , 
links between subject positions, within and between subjects, which together 
produce “identity.” These are not an impediment fo understanding the subject, 
but rather the only means to ascertain the equally multiple and changing forms of 
power and subordination.
In a similar argument, Judith Butler objects to the notion that questionirig the 
construction of subjectivity is equated to “doing away with” the subject (1992:
15). “[T]o claim that« the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is deter­
mined” (12). If the subject is constructed, then agency, too, is a construction, not 
an a priori given.
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[I]f we agree that politics and power exist already at the level at which the subject 
and its agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can ht presumed only
at the cost of refusing to inquire, into its construction___We need instead to ask,
what possibilities of mobilization are produced on the basis of existing configura­
tions of discourse and power? Where are the possibilities of reworking that very 
matrix of power by which we are constituted, of reconstituting the legacy of that 
constitution, and of working against each other those processes of regulation that 
can destabilize existing power regimes? (13)
While both Mouffe and Butler argue that the subject and her or his agency do not 
disappear but, instead, are constituted relationally, not absolutely, are never fixed 
but always evolving, many questions remain. Indeed, the areas insufficiently 
theorized by Foucault (What precisely causes discourses to alter historically? 
How do various, multiple discourses construct specific subjects and in what 
proportions or relations of impact? What are the mechanisms by which change 
and agency operate?) remain insufficiently understood in terms of their applica­
tion to film studies as well as other disciplines. While the work of Hall, Bakhtin, 
Mouffe, Butler, and many other, scholars marks fruitful beginnings, much is yet 
to be done on questions of representation and the discursive subject of film/ 
media/art, and further, on the ways representation conflicts and collaborates 
with other cultural discourses.
How do viewers operationalize specific readings? That is, how do spectators 
select a specific reading(s) or shift among readings? Do different information 
effects, such as those provided by close readings, political engagement, etc., alter 
earlier, or what might have otherwise been different, subject positions and 
therefore alter interpretations of a text? What mechanisms are required in 
order to deploy particular readings or deactivate others?
How does the individual operationalize certain identities at specific moments: 
for instance, what enables a specific female spectator to read a text from the 
position of her gendered subjectivity and simultaneously understand its 
“intended” preferred meanings? What are the mechanisms which might account 
for that specific female spectator constructing an oppositional reading from her 
gendered subjèct position but a dominant reading from her perspective as a 
râcialized identity? Among competing or simply differing discourses invoked 
by a text, what allows specific readings to take on greater significance - signific­
ance in both its senses oTjnèaning and importance? Why do some readings 
“matter” ta a given spectator more than others? What permits a viewer to change 
his or her “mind” about previously held interpretations?
Do systems of representation such as film and television form their own 
discursive formation, or are they the confluence of multiple discourses, such as, 
in film, the narrative discourse(s) of the script, the cinematographic discourse(s) 
of the image, and so on? Do genres represent their own discrete discourses within 
a system of representation such as cinema or cut across modes of representations 
(film, TV, novels, poems), encompassing many diverse socio-cultural practices 
and artifacts? Do the romance genres - the “women’s weepies” of the 1940s or
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today’s “date movies” - form part of a discursive formation on romance which 
includes Harlequin romances, Hallmark cards, and Valentine’s Day (rendering 
discipline-based analyses insufficient, thus helping to explain the prominence of 
cultural studies)? To what degree and in what ways are the many filiris (and TV 
shows) that follow the conventions of courtroom dramas, or resolve their dra­
matic dilemmas in courtrooms, part of a representational system of narrative 
conventions or an armature of dominant social discourses surrounding justice and 
the juridical system? While the likely answer is “both” to questions concerning 
the particular (representational) and general (socio-cultural) discursive forma­
tions invoked by any text, how do we conceptualize and articulate this? How we 
do so is of significance because, as a site where representational and social 
discourses intersect (and perhaps the media’s impact can be partially explained 
by their ability to ipvoke both sorts of discourse relationally), it marks a promising 
point for agency and political intervention.
As a series of discursive formations, what kinds of knowledge/power are 
deployed by the representational to construct what kinds of subjectivity? In 
such post-structuralist theoretical configurations, spectatorship/readership are 
“technologies of the self,” historical and cultural modes of subject formation. 
While Foucault’s work does not focus on the relations of representation in detail, 
in an interview he offers a provocative suggestion concerning the need for 
creativity to displace Sartrean (and humanist) notions of authenticity. “I think 
that the only acceptable practical consequence of what Sartre has said is to link 
his theoretical insight to the practice of creativity - and not of authenticity. From 
the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical 
consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art” (1984a: 351). While 
Foucault’s statement can be interpreted as invoking a romantic and modernist 
conception of art, it can also be understood as extending an alternative cultural 
metaphoi- or paradigm in which the truth-generating agency of authenticity and 
rational subjectivity are displaced by the meaning-generating agency of the 
creative subject.
3 The Social Subject
Although the discursive subject has not, to date, been formulated specifically in 
terms of spectatorship, it has had significant impact on cultural studies and the 
latter’s concern with the social subject and identity formation.
Cultural studies marks a theoretical return to the “everyday experiences” 
or lived specificities of the material, historical subject. This realignment 
occurs in the face of the seeming “death of the subject” - because aru entirely 
cultural construct - predicted by (or, some would argue, predicated on) post­
structuralism.
Cultural studies’ interest in the social subject is not, however, a replication of 
the humanist subject who creates “himself’ and controls the surrounding world.
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Acknowledging that individual subjects are multiply and complexly constructed, 
cultural studies is an attempt to integrate the discursive subject of post-structur­
alism as, on the one hànd, the effect of representational and other signifying 
practices, and, on the other hand, an agent of socio-cultural constructs and 
institutions. While a Foucaultian might argue that the distinction between the 
signifying and. the social is illusory in that all is signifying practice, cultural 
studies maintains the distinction in order to preserve a recognition of people’s 
material existences, which can be made better or worse through political activity. 
“The problem for cultural studies has been to incorporate the significance of 
sliding signifiers and disappearing signifieds without asserting that meaning no 
longer exists, without giving up a politics, without lapsing into a radical moral 
relativism, without abandoning the interventionist commitment which has 
motivated the research of cultural theorists” (Slack and Whitt 1992: 583).
The concern to maintain a position for political intervention is consónant with 
the Marxist origins of cultural studies, as well as the considerable impact femin­
ism, race and ethnicity studies, gay and lesbian studies, and other* identity 
formations have had upon it, in addition to class. However, the formulation of 
an identity politics, or a politics of difference, seemingly necessitates the exist­
ence of a social subject with some range of conscious agency in order to enact or 
affect a political agenda.
More specifically, cultural studies works to apply varying notions of the post­
structuralist subject to forms of representation in popular culture. It does so 
while seeking to avoid the totalizing overdetermination of psychoanalytic theory 
and Althusserian-based concepts of ideology, in which the subject is determined 
by dominant ideology as it is embedded in the text, that is, the text instructs the 
viewer how to understand it and so positions the spectator in subjectivity. 
Cultural studies is also a reaction against earlier paradigms of audience research 
that tended to focus on quantitative data such as audience demographics (what 
has been skeptically referred to as the ‘‘bums in the seats” approach), and that 
presumed a passive viewership, which surrendered itself to the overpowering 
effects of the media.
Instead, cultural studies argues that the spectator is the result of various 
discourses put in play by the text, but also the subject of social, economic, and 
political practices beyond the text, which are brought to bear at the moment of 
screen/viewer interaction. Wliile the potentially innumerable configurations of 
such a balance have yet to be sufficiently mapped out, David Morley explains the 
intentions shaping this notion of the audience member / social subject:
The Althusserian drift of much early cultural studies work... Would reduce [the 
individual subject] to the status of a mere personification of a given structure, 
“spoken” by the discourses which cross the space of his subjectivity. However, it is 
not simply Althusser who is at issue here; much of the psychoanalytic work on the 
theory of ideology generates an equally passive notion of subjectivity, in which the 
subject is precisely “spoken” by the discourses which constitute that person. I
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want to try to formulate a position from which we can see the person actively 
producing meanings from the restricted range of cultural resources which his or 
her structural position has allowed them access to. (quoted in Turner 1992; 193-4)
In contrast to approaches in which spectators are “spoken” by the text, cultural 
studies theorists began to ask: What is actually occurring for viewers? How are 
social subjects using texts specifically, and to what ends? These concerns led to 
the ethnographic methodology associated with cultural studies, and to investiga­
tions of specific subordinate communities or sub-cultures, as exemplified in the 
work of David Morley, Janice Rad way, len Ang, Dick Hebdidge, Angela McRob- 
bie, and others.
Their work posited a much more active viewer than had been theorized 
previously in either textual/ideological studies or earlier audience research, a 
viewer capable of resisting dominant encodings and forging oppositional read­
ings, readers who actively and continuously participate in the formation of their 
own identities. Analyzing the results of her study of elderly viewers of the British 
soap Crossroads, Dorothy Hobson comments:
Communication is by no means a one-way process and the contribution which the 
audience makes to Crossroads is as important as the messages which the program- 
makers put into the program. In this sense, what the Crossroads audience has 
revealed is that there can be as many interpretations of the program as the 
individual viewers bring to it. There is no overall intrinsic message or meaning 
in the work, but it comes alive and communicates when the viewers add their own 
interpretations of a program, (quoted in Turner 1992; 133)
The emergent spectator of cultural studies, then, contributes two significant 
variations to the notion of spectatorship. First, the text is produced only at the 
moment of interaction with the audience member, bringing the spectator/reader/ 
viewer to the forefront of the mediated event (which in cultural studies, to date, 
has been far more extensively television analysis, not film). It becomes impossible 
to speak of the meanings of a text separately from its viewing subject, the two 
becoming indissoluble. Second, the viewing subject is composed of the interaction 
between the effects of discourses invoked by the text/representation and the 
effects of social and material discourses beyond. Spectatorship is formulated as 
the convergence of textual subjects and social subjects. “[T]he focus of critical 
attention in cultural studies switched from ideology and its effects toward audi­
ences or readerships, since it is at this point that meanings generated in and by 
media discourses actually go live socially, where textual and social power intersect, 
and where the distinction between them is meaningless” (Hartley 1996: 225).
Further, the spectator is no longer positioned in subjectivity by the text, but, 
under the concept of hegemony, can offer resistance to the ideologies of the text. 
Indeed, cultural studies understands popular culture as the terrain where cultural 
power, relationships, and systems of meaning are negotiated and established - 
and, consequently, can be resisted and/or reestablished otherwise.
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John Fiske describes one of the projects for cultural studies theorists as the 
discovery of:
how actual audience groups actively use television as part of their own cultures - 
that is, use it to make meanings that are useful to them in making sense of their own
social experiences and therefore of themselves___Exploring the strategies by
which subordinate subcultures make their own meanings in resistance to the 
dominant is currently one of the most productive strands of cultural studies. 
(1992: 300, 304)
While this avenue of inquiry has indeed been productive, resulting in the 
identification and analysis of numerous specific communities of social and view­
ing subjects in terms of their uses of representational forms, it has also been 
critiqued for displaying a Utopian or ideal notion of resistance. That is, any sub­
cultural manifestation of distinct identity can be received as a potential form of 
resistance beyond the parameters of dominant ideologies. No means have yet 
been established to determine which sub-cultural configurations of identity 
might prove beneficial or detrimental to that community vis-à-vis the resistance 
to or imposition of dominant discursive practices and institutions. What remains 
for cultural studies is to forge a position that avoids what David Morley has 
referred to as “the improper romanticism of consumer freedoms” while continu­
ing to avert an earlier “paranoid fear of global control” (quoted in Ang 1996:260).
Another problematic facing the ongoing endeavor of cultural studies is to 
develop what Janice Radway describes as “a rich and complex understanding of 
the different, multiple, everchanging configurations of subjectivity dialectically 
produced through the negotiation between historically produced individuals and 
material, social and discursive contexts” (1996: 238). Using her own work with 
women readers of romance novels as an example, Radway continues: “To con­
struct her, then, as a ‘romance reader’ may be to isolate only one small portion of
her life and to mistake that part for the whole__ The womanhood or femininity
constructed through romance reading may well be at odds with the femininity 
constructed in the process of doing aerobics, watching Rosearme, or playing soft- 
ball” (244-5). Audience (or any subject) analysis, then, is an attempt to contain 
what is the constant stream of subjectivity in order to study it, isolating one or a 
few of its aspects, applicable only for a given moment and specific location.
This complex stream of interwoven and changing subjectivities is what len 
Ang refers to as “radical contextualism,” which she welcomes as an opportunity 
to better understand the “chaotic” empirical landscape of audience experiences 
(1996: 257). Ang argues that the way to approach such a chaotic landscape of 
subjectivity is to work “within the framework of a particular cultural politics,” 
which then allows the researcher to “meaningfully decide which contexts we 
wish to foreground as particularly relevant, and which other ones could, for the 
moment, within this particular political conjuncture, be left unexplored” (258). 
While Ang’s approach addresses the difficulty of imagining “where to begin and 
where to end the analysis” (253), it raises the question of an a priori politics, and
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therefore of an a priori social subject. Radway’s suggestion is that cultural studies 
embrace the daunting task and “take the fluid process of articulation as its topic, 
that is, the process whereby the historical human subject is constructed through 
the linkage, clash and confluence of many different discourses, practices, and 
activities” (1996: 245).
In addition to mapping the complex processes of subjectivity, cultural studies 
has yet to delineate the mechanisms between text and society. As John Hartley 
points out:
If the me^ exert power and influence over their audiences - that is, socially - how 
is it done textually? And if media texts exert power, what is the place of meaning in 
the analysis of power.?... In spite of Foucaultian, postmodernist, feminist and 
other intefventions, or perhaps because of them, it seems as hard as ever to explain 
the link between texmal and social power. (1996: 221, 224)
Additionally, cultural studies’ emphasis on sub-cultural groups raises ques­
tions about the relationship of the individual to identifying communities, and the 
relationship of both, respectively, to dominant discourses. In what ways and to 
what degree is the individual merely a representative of the group(s) or the 
configuration of a “unique” individual in its accumulation of a multiple but 
specific series of subject positions?
Angela McRobbie suggests that: “What really is at stake is the nature and form 
of the relationships which bind these differences together and from which they 
accrue their meaning. It is in relation to each other that identity is formed. If 
meaning is relational, so too is identity” (1992: 726). If identity is the relational 
process of the confluence of differences within the individual, between the 
individual and specific communities of identity formation, and between identify­
ing communities, how might this multitude of simultaneous registers of subject 
positions enact or allow slippage, selection, agency, and intervention?
Spectatorship hás been theorized, variously and to date, as the construction of the 
viewing subject through psychic processes, discursive formations, and social and 
historical relations. It seems most productive to consider the spectator as the 
effect of such processes, formations, and relations as they operate concurrently, 
rather than thinking of each dynamic as singular or exclusive of the others. Less 
clear, then, are the complex and simultaneous interconnections between these 
dynamics, which may render the spectator as anything along a barometer of » 
viewership from passive imbiber of pre-packaged ideology to active and success­
ful resistent of these same oppressive psychic, discursive, and socio-historical 
forces. Each theorization - psychoanalytic, discursive, social - has contributed to 
the concept of spectatorship, while not managing to address all the problematics 
summoned up by the other, differing approaches.
While the social subject of cultural studies regains a political position in that 
the act of viewing and the meanings created are sites of struggle and contéstation, 
the theory doesn’t yet sufficiently explain the operations by which the viewing
162
Spectatorship and Subjectivity
subject attains a position of (some) power as the participant in the process of his 
or her own subject formation, able to resist, in however limited a manner, the 
dominance of social and cultural discourses. Similarly, although discursive 
theory offers a more complex way of understanding subjectivity than psycho­
analytic theory, rendering the subject fluid rather than fixed, it has the same 
difficulties as cultural studies in elaborating the mechanisms by which such 
subjectivities might occur.
Limited and erroneous in its universalizing, unverifiable claims for the uncon­
scious and its lack of participatory (hence political) position in the, process of 
“becoming” a subject, psychoanalytic theory did, however, attempt to account 
for reasons why the viewer is “captured” by the text. Addressing the questions of 
what mechanisms operate to “fix” the viewer into an oppressive position in 
seeming opposition to her or his self-interests, and why, once the spectator 
realizes these are the operative mechanisms, she or he can’t break free of that 
captivation, psychoanalytic theory’s responses were the concepts of pleasure and 
desire, operating alongside social and ideological coercion.
Cultural studies developed, in part, out of resistance to the notion of the 
spectator/subject as “psychic dupe,” determined entirely by the robotic effects 
of his or her own unconscious processes - similar to the criticized concept of the 
public as cultural dupes, simplémindedly affected by the dominant ideologies 
embedded in the popular. Yet, neither the social subject nor the discursive 
subject adequately explains the determinants, the “why” of specific subject or 
spectatorial articulations, remaining open projects for both cultural studies and 
post-structuralism.
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